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I. INTRODUCTION
You truly do me a great honor by inviting me to give the
Sobeloff Lecture. I am particularly pleased to give this lecture be-
cause of who my predecessors have been and, even more, because
of what kind of lawyer, judge, and mensch Judge Sobeloff was. It is
no exaggeration to say that to speak ofJudge Simon E. Sobeloff to-
day, nearly fifteen years after his death, is to speak of a legendary
figure. Lawyers I admire tell and retell the tale of Solicitor General
Sobeloff's refusal to sign the government's brief in Peters v. Hobby,' a
case challenging the harassing application of a "Red scare" govern-
ment loyalty program. Professor Peters of the Yale Medical School
already had passed several loyalty tests without incident, and Judge
Sobeloff believed that the government should confess error and be
done with a bad business.
Judge Sobeloff's courageous decision not to go along despite
considerable pressure simply to sign off is the stuff of legends, in
part because Judge Bazelon retold the story at the memorial service
for Judge Sobeloff.2 Judge Bazelon noted that Sobeloff's refusal to
be a good soldier, to hold his nose but to sign the brief, very possi-
* Professor of Law, Boston University. B.A., Yale University, 1969; M.U.S., 1972;
J.D., Yale Law School, 1972. After many years of teaching law, I find myself blessed with
friends who are ready to aid my scholarly efforts and even to try to save me from myself.
Before presenting this lecture, I was lucky to have the chance to try it out "out of town"
at law faculty workshops at Louisiana State University and the University of Texas, as
well as at Boston University. All three sessions helped me a great deal; I hope those who
talked with me about groups are able to detect at least a few shards of evidence of their
contributions.
Friends who deserve particular thanks for their conversation and their careful, criti-
cal, and constructive reading of early drafts include: Kathy Abrams, Ed Baker, Victor
Brudney, Steve Diamond, Mary Ann Glendon, John Leubsdorf, Hugh Macgill, Maeva
Marcus, Bruce Mann, Martha Minow, Jim Pope, Larry Sager, David Seipp, Carol Weis-
brod, and Larry Yackle. I also had outstanding research assistance from Linda Love
Mesler and, particularly, from Leiv Blad. Finally, as always, Peggy Thomas did an in-
comparable job of taking care of our entire crew. I am most grateful to Mike Kelly and
the faculty and students at the University of Maryland School of Law for the opportunity
to speak in memory ofJudge Sobeloff.
1. 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
2. Judge Simon E. Sobeloff Memorial, 523 F.2d 6, 6 (1975) (remarks ofJudge David
L. Bazelon).
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bly cost Judge Sobeloff an appointment to the United States
Supreme Court.3 And Judge Bazelon stared directly at ChiefJustice
Burger, the man who did sign the brief, as he recalled Judge
Sobeloff's rare act of lawyerly courage.
According to Judge Bazelon, Judge Sobeloff told friends who
expressed concern about his decision and its possible effects on his
career: "I'm not doing this so I can live with my friends. I do it only
because I must live with myself."4 Noble as it was, Judge Sobeloff's
reply suggests a typical, important, but ultimately false, dichotomy.
I do not mean that Judge Sobeloff intended to insist on an
"either/or" choice between one's circle of friends and oneself. In-
deed, he understood better than most that we are made who we are
by the communities we come from and by the communities we
choose to enter. Or, in more academically fashionable terms, the
webs of significance spun even by singular individuals mean some-
thing because of the groups in which these individuals achieve
meaning.
In less high-falutin words, Judge Sobeloff's action and his ex-
planation for it exemplify a vital, communal story. His legal legend
grows not only because of his principled refusal to go along with
injustice, but also because as a judge he demonstrated "learning in
wisdom, tempered by a tremendous feeling for people."5
Even as individuals trained in the atomizing, skeptical cauldron
of the law, we cannot escape the power of group symbols. We rec-
ognize and help make communal legends and tales that suggest how
the excessively individualistic focus of our law is misleading and
often mischief-making. As Karl Llewellyn argued, in legal thought
we maintain a "vicious heritage of regularly viewing parties . . .as
single individuals." 6 I am going to invoke legal realists, of all peo-
ple, as I scrutinize legends and ghosts.
II. THE COMMUNAL GOLDEN AGE AS A POSSIBLE GOLDEN CALF
I do not join uncritically in the mystical leap backwards to a
golden age of community, even though such a move is much in
vogue today. The legal historian in me doubts that there ever was a
time when contented folks knew their places in some great chain of
being. Probably, people never generously tolerated each other's
3. Id. at 7-8.
4. Id. at 8.
5. Id.
6. Llewellyn, What Price Contract ?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 734 n.63
(1931).
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foibles while appreciating the craftsmanship of virtuous lutemakers.
Our ancestors, no matter where they lived, never had the time, incli-
nation, or mutual respect needed to undergo the many evenings re-
quired for real participatory democracy.
Nor am I urging a golden mean between atomistic individual-
ism and organic republicanism." Instead, I suggest that we have lost
familiarity with a crucial phenomenon concerning community, and
that it is important to develop an independent constitutional right
to freedom of association.
The right I advocate is not limited to a choice between intimate
associations and associations instrumental in the cause of expres-
sion. It is neither merely a protected expressive right nor an unpro-
tected commercial claim. Like all other rights I know, this right will
not always be trump. In a sense, of course, all legal rights are in-
strumental. To put this skeptical point another way, in law there are
no ends, just means. But not every conglomeration of individuals
should be equally able to invoke the right I proclaim here.
To join groups is as American as for all of us to proclaim our
individualism together all the time. As Madison, Tocqueville, and
myriad other, less venerated elitists made abundantly clear, volun-
tary associations in America have been both distinct, and very prob-
ably more vital to political and social stability than are analogous
groups in other countries.' The role of groups both in bringing
about, and sometimes in resisting, the unspeakable horror of recent
German and Soviet history, for example, makes American ambiva-
lence about groups seem something of a curiosity, a singular tension
almost peripheral to the main action of modern history. Yet that
might be said of our constitutional law as well. Because I follow my
late friend Bob Cover in the belief that law is a bridge, perhaps the
bridge, between what we are and what we might become, I am not
reluctant to use judicial opinions as my texts, as useful springboards
for trying to depart from current, dominant ways of thinking.9
7. I am sobered by the old southern political saying that "the only thing you'll find
in the middle of the road is a yellow stripe and dead animals."
8. For a brief review of the statements of Madison, Tocqueville, and other observ-
ers concerning the incomparable importance of groups in the United States, see Soifer,
infra note 12.
9. Bob Cover often advanced what at first appears to be a bleak vision, particularly
dark concerning the role of judges. See R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975); Cover, Vio-
lence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) [hereinafter Viokncee]. But he also expressed
great hope in law as "a challenging enrichment of social life," Cover, Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 68 (1983) [hereinafter Nomos ], that might provide "the bridge-
the committed social behavior which constitutes the way a group of people will attempt
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It seems appropriate to begin with one of Tocqueville's pre-
scient statements, words that unfortunately seem more accurate
every year. Tocqueville said there is a great danger of "administra-
tive despotism" in America.10 He warned of an "orderly, gentle,
peaceful slavery which .. .could be combined, more easily than is
generally supposed, with some of the external forms of freedom and
• .. [has] a possibility of getting itself established even under the
shadow of the sovereignty of the people."" To counter this danger,
to amplify the free voices of individuals, Tocqueville emphasized the
importance he perceived in the extraordinary propensity, even the
basic natural right, of Americans to become a nation ofjoiners.' 2 It
is the constitutive memory of that function, that elemental aspect of
American law both on the books and in action, that I seek to resusci-
tate so we may commence reconstruction.
III. WHY DISCUSS AN INDEPENDENT RIGHT OF
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION?
These days we are inundated with talk about groups, communi-
ties, and associations. Why is this particular fixation such a major
part of our intellectual milieu? Why hang rights on groups? Tales
(and the shaggy dog stories they tend to wag) of the hopes and dan-
gers of faith in community have waxed and waned throughout
American history. The effort to grope for groups continues to pro-
duce strange, perhaps even dangerous, bedfellows. Many of us
maintain healthy fears of decisions made by unaccountable power
elites who gather at exclusive watering-holes, of the grip of cults
over the will of individuals, of the spectre of mob violence, and of
to get from here to there." Id. at 9. See also Cover, The Folktas ofJustice: Tales ofJurisdic-
tion, 14 CAP. U.L. REV. 179, 181 (1985) [hereinafter Folktales of Justice].
if we embrace communal ghosts even while we recognize their dangerous tenden-
cies, we may create more and better room for ourselves and our posterity. A room
entirely of one's own, Virginia Woolf notwithstanding, is a tough place to work or live.
We need privacy, but we also need others to make sense of our efforts at communica-
tion. As Milner Ball recently asked, "Isn't the primary reality and real mystery the com-
munity? Is it I or is it the neighbor and our binding that is wonderful?" Ball, Humanizing
Law (Book Review), 35 UCLA L. REV. 547, 554 (1988) (reviewing J. VINING, THE Au-
THORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 1986).
10. A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 666-68 (J.P. Mayer ed. 1966).
11. Id. at 667.
12. Id. Tocqueville's views on groups provide one of the themes discussed in Soifer,
"Toward a Generalized Notion of the Right to Form or Join ".: An Essay for Tom Emerson, 38 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 641 (1988). See also Schlesinger, Biography of a Nation of Joiners, 50 A.
HIST. REV. i (1944).
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the baleful influence of economic power consolidated in lobbying
and election spending.
I cannot put all such fears to rest. Nor will my argument for a
limited independent right of freedom of association blaze a clear
path to an other-directed, altruistic utopia. But we may find a glim-
mer of hope in dusty but intriguing constitutional decisions and in a
debate about communal ghosts that is nearly a century old.
By thinking seriously about our myriad communities in the con-
text of several recent constitutional cases, we may at least avoid the
kind of howler exemplified in President Reagan's Executive Order
12,333."s This executive order reconstituted National Security
Council procedures in December 1981 to enhance government se-
crecy' 4 (and thereby set in motion the coups-de-loop and loopy
countercoups that helped bring us the Iran-Contra rats' nest). Our
President-or people speaking for or through our President-
stressed, repeatedly, and with capital letters no less, the common
concern of something called "the Intelligence Community."'" This
doubly oxymoronic statement reveals the propensity of sponge-like
words such as "community" and "intelligence" to be easily deval-
ued, or worse. Being more careful, less mystical, and yet neither
hypocritical nor hypercritical about the symbolic power of the idea
of community may help us struggle forward a few steps through the
mythic haze of individualism which does much to keep the American
legal system afloat. 6 When we deny the vital functioning of groups
in our world, we even impoverish the pursuit of individual
fulfillment.
One might say, however, that the individual in tension with
community is a trite tale. In fact, it is so trite that it falls into the
trap once called the fallacy of "the conservation of historical en-
ergy. '"17 It is a common yet nevertheless big mistake to assume that
if a sense of community decreases, a sense of individual worth auto-
matically increases. It is also an error simply to assume that the re-
verse is necessarily or even generally true. But even the
13. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981). In describing the "Goals
[of] the National Intelligence Effort," the first specific goal mentioned was: "Maximum
emphasis should be given to fostering analytical competition among appropriate ele-
ments of the Intelligence Community." Id. at 59,942.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See generally A. COHEN, THE SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY 11-21
(1985).
17. J. HEXTER, REAPPRAISALS IN HISTORY 42 (1962).
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sophisticated irony that individuals need others and that hell is
other people seems unexceptional.
What is striking about legal thinking is that we insist on individ-
ual rights without inquiring seriously about the internal or external
dimensions of the paradigmatic individuals we construct. We simply
ignore major themes of twentieth century science, psychology, soci-
ology, and anthropology, to say nothing of what may be even trick-
ier genres of literary criticism, religion, and history. In part this is
because to do otherwise seems to require belief in, or at least obei-
sance to, what Morris Raphael Cohen derided as "communal
ghosts.""' It is also because we have generally assumed progress
from status to contract, and we have allowed legal fictions about
class representation, corporate entities, and formal citizenship to go
virtually unchallenged.'" Legally, the individual still thrives in
splendid, hypothetical isolation.
Our first-year law school paradigms help blind us to a point Ar-
thur Bentley made eighty years ago: "The most insignificant suit
between two parties over a contract is dealt with socially on the basis
of great group interests which have established the conditions and
the bounds for it."" ° In chasing A and B around Blackacre, we cele-
brate detachment, but we may confuse a lawyer's professional
detachment with the detachment of the undertaker. We overem-
phasize symmetry and the need to reason things out. When logic
18. M. COHEN, Communal Ghosts in Political Theory, in REASON AND NATURE 386 (1931).
This essay was originally published as Cohen, Communal Ghosts and Other Perils in Social
Philosophy, 16J. PHIL. 673 (1919). For a fine discussion of Cohen, and particularly of his
tendency to seek balance by defining entire fields of discourse in terms of monolithic,
abstract extremes, see D. HOLLINGER, MORRIS R. COHEN AND THE SCIENTIFIC IDEAL 51-58
(1973).
19. For recent works criticizing such assumptions, see, e.g., M. DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS,
PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986); R.
VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW (1978); S. YEAZELL, FROM
MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987). See also Abrams,
"Raising Politics Up:" Alinority Political Participation and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 449 (1988).
20. A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 277 (1908). In C. Weisbrod, Article
Two as a Framework for Groups (1987) (manuscript on file with author), Weisbrod elabo-
rates reasons why Karl Llewellyn was so enamored of Bentley that he described some of
his own work in the early 1930s as simply "a rediscovery of Bentley" in Llewellyn, The
Constitution as Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. I, 1 n.I (1934). For a fine discussion of
Llewellyn's attention to differences among groups of merchants in the context of draft-
ing the Uniform Commercial Code, see Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and
the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1987). An earlier European version of Bent-
ley's pluralist point may be found in Georg Simmel's essay. See G. SIMMEL, Conflict, in
CONFLICT AND THE WEB OF GROUP AFFILIATIONS 37 (K. Wolff trans. 1964), quoted in C.
WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA 113 (1980).
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and reason defy common sense, we tend to throw up our hands and
pretend that the solution has been reasoned out by someone else.
Alternatively, we resort to claims that, in the long run, benevolent
results will follow if we deny benevolent principles in the short
run. 1
Today, academics dress up the rediscovery Of groups in the
garb of new-fangled notions about interpretive communities, neo-
republican virtues, or "a living tradition [that] is an historically ex-
tended, socially embodied argument."' 22 Even some law professors
now recognize a paradoxical universal need "to be loved alone." 23
Because "there is nothing like a paradox to take the scum off your
mind, ' 12 4 I rush forth in pursuit of some of our communal ghosts.
Let there be no excruciating, perhaps medically contraindicated
suspense. I will try to show how an independent constitutional right
to freedom of association would make a difference in actual cases
and in general clarity of thought. I am not talking merely, or even
much, about family units, political organizations, religious groups,
21. These thoughts are hardly new, of course. For a specific source for most of
them, see T. ARNOLD, The Mystery ofJursprudence, in THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 59-71
(1935).
22. A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 206-07 (1981). See ao Symposium on Republicanism,
97 YALE L.J. 493 (1988). The recent use and abuse of the concept of "interpretive com-
munity" in legal interpretation can be traced largely to the exchange between Owen Fiss
and Stanley Fish in Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 TFx. L. REV. 373 (1982).
23. W. H. Auden put it as follows:
The windiest militant trash
Important Persons shout
Is not so crude as our wish:
What mad Nijinsky wrote
About Diaghilev
Is true of the normal heart;
For the error bred in the bone
Of each woman and each man
Craves what it cannot have,
Not universal love
But to be loved alone.
W.H. AUDEN, September 1, 1939, in THE COLLECTED POETRY OF W.H. AUDEN 57, 58-59
(1945). In the original published version, Auden also included the following wonderful
lines, which he later omitted as "a damned lie." H. CARPENTER, W.H. AUDEN 330
(1981).
There is no such thing as the State
And no one exists alone;
Hunger allows no choice
To the citizen or the police;
We must love one another or die.
W.H. AUDEN: SELECTED POEMS 86-89 (E. Mendelson ed. 1979).
24. 1 HOLMES-LAsKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND
HAROLDJ. LASKt, 1916-1925, at 389 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
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or the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), all of which already receive considerable constitutional
protection. I am more interested in doing some detective work
about other organizations, because they exemplify group entities
entitled to legal protection sometimes different from the protection
afforded either to those individuals who constitute the sum of their
parts or to groups protected because of their intimacy or their ex-
pressive conduct.2 6
There already are important practical examples in which group
identity is protected even when individuals would not be, e.g.,
groups who parade, report the news, engage in certain labor activi-
ties and boycotts, face persecution in their home countries. Ed
Baker has provided a detailed explication of the history and limita-
tions of current parade permit doctrine, for example, as well as com-
pelling arguments for why analysis of the right of assembly should
not be subordinated, as it traditionally has been, to judicial analysis
of speech rights, thereby allowing assembly rights to be easily bal-
anced away through invocation of a "reasonableness" test.27 And
we should not despair when we can find no overarching principle
that permits us even hard-won generalizations combining families,
people stuck in elevators together, collaborative reproduction units,
Native American tribes, religious cults, unions, multinational corpo-
rations, and even gaggles of legal academics. No matter what the
legal form, we have important associations to consider.28
25. This surely is not the place to attempt the daunting task of offering a general
taxonomy of groups. By the mid-1950s, "an enterprising American sociologist had un-
covered more than 90 discrete definitions" of the term "community" in use within the
social sciences. Hamilton, Editor's Forward to A. COHEN, THE SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION
OF COMMUNITY 7 (1985). See also C. SMITH & A. FREEDMAN, VOLUNTARY AssoCiAT^ONS:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITERATURE (1972). We have made considerable "progress" in
complicating the definitional and conceptual questions since.
26. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 107 S. Ct.
616, 628 (1986) (election spending by business corporation or union "raises the pros-
pect that resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to provide an
unfair trade advantage in the political marketplace," in contrast to spending by non-
profit organization protected by first amendment); Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 617-22 (1984) (Jaycees organization is neither an intimate association nor suf-
ficiently related to protected expression to receive freedom of association protection);
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915-20 (1982) (local NAACP chapter
protected from huge state court fine imposed on organizing and enforcing lengthy eco-
nomic boycott of white merchants). For detailed discussions of these decisions, see
Soifer, supra note 12.
27. See Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatoy Parade Permits and Time, Place, and
Manner Regulations, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 937 (1984).
28. It seems entirely appropriate to tell a truncated ghost story or two here, right
next to the graveyard that holds, though it may not contain, one of Boston's great gifts
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IV. A BRIEF HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
A. A Few Beginnings in the Cases
United States v. Cruikshank 2 9 is a notorious 1875 case that de-
serves even greater notoriety. It was one of the long, tragic series of
decisions, beginning in the 1870s, in which the United States
Supreme Court reneged on the promise of the immediate post-Civil
War era and used astonishingly formalistic, overly technical con-
struction either to bury or to kill (Mr. Poe, are you there?) the
amendments and civil rights statutes that together constituted the
second constitution.30 Cruikshank is particularly appalling. Chief
Justice Waite dramatically illustrated how to operate mechanical ju-
risprudence in holding an indictment insufficient to sustain the con-
victions of whites who murdered more than one hundred blacks who
had gathered at a political meeting in 1873. s'
"The very idea of a government, republican in form," said
Waite, "implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably
for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for re-
dress of grievances. ' '3 2 Moreover, Waite asserted that "the right of
the people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes existed long
before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States." 33 It
was, in fact, precisely because this right to assemble was so basic, so
fundamental as to be preconstitutional and within what Waite ex-
to Baltimore-and I don't mean American League pennants, snappy waterfront shop-
ping areas, or University of Maryland Law School Dean Mike Kelly-Edgar Allan Poe.
Poe is generally credited as the originator of the modem detective story. In The Murders
in the Rue Morgue, Poe has the narrator observe that "[t]he necessary knowledge is of
what to observe." E.A. POE, 4 COLLECTED WORKS 177 (1902). Or, as Albert Einstein put
it, "It is the theory which decides what we can observe." See D. BELL, COMING OF POST-
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 9 (1973). (Poe also began his haunting story, The Man of the Crowd,
with the quotation, "Ce grand malheur, de ne pouvoir etre seul," roughly translated as
"The great unhappiness is never to be able to be alone." E.A. POE, supra, at 159.)
29. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
30. Id. See, e.g., H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875 (1982); R. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS,
1866-1876 (1985); S. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS (1968);
Cogan, Section 1985(3)'s Restructuring of Equality: An Essay on Texts, History, Progress, and
Cynicism, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 515 (1987); Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96
YALE L.J. 1916, 1935-53 (1987).
31. 92 U.S. at 559.
32. Id. at 552.
33. Id. at 551. Curiously, two years earlier, even in the Slaughter-House Cases, Jus-
tice Miller's crabbed majority opinion described "[tihe right to peaceably assemble and
petition for redress of grievances," along with the privilege of habeas corpus, as "rights
of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." The Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873).
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plicitly called the "natural rights of man" that the right somehow
could not be protected by the federal government.3 4 Instead, it fell
within "the very highest duty of the States." 5 What is most striking
for our purposes is how readily and emphatically a unanimous
Court, in the supposed heyday of Langdellian formalism, moved to
a natural law, preconstitutional theory of a fundamental right to as-
semble enjoyed by all citizens as "members of the political commu-
nity to which they belong. '"36
That judges generally honored this nascent right of freedom of
association only in the breach is all too apparent in judicial opinions
over the next half-century explaining why injunctions might be is-
sued against union activity." As Haggai Hurvitz points out, "only
shortly before the boycotts of 1885-1886, American courts estab-
lished a doctrine permitting the peaceful boycott as a legitimate
weapon in economic conflicts under which resulting losses were de-
fined as damages without legal remedy."3
Once it became obvious that labor unions could and would im-
pose boycotts, and then successfully invoke this doctrine, however,
judges resorted to a series of legal innovations to justify enjoining,
criminalizing, and otherwise prohibiting and punishing this and
34. 92 U.S. at 551-52.
35. Id. at 553. Waite relied on the preamble to the federal constitution and the Dec-
laration of Independence, as well as his own sense of what rights are so basic as to
constitute preconstitutional or natural rights. Tragically, Waite similarly relied on his
own sense about the entirely separate spheres of state and federal government; he used
this stark, formalistic dichotomy in conjunction with his creation of a requirement that
racial hostility be specifically averred to strike down the convictions of the only 2 rioters
convicted after more than 100 were indicted for their murderous acts. It is intriguing to
consider, by way of contrast, Justice Bradley's circuit court opinion in Cruikshank, which
provided a powerful summary of the strand of republican ideology prevalent just after
the Civil War that insisted upon a basic governmental duty to protect as a fundamental
right. United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 710 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (no. 14, 897).
Unfortunately, Bradley seems to have changed his mind, and he silently joined Waite's
unanimous opinion for the Supreme Court. 92 U.S. at 559.
36. 92 U.S. at 549. Indeed, Waite found it worth emphasizing that "the people who
compose the community ... in their associated capacity, have established or submitted
themselves to the dominion of the government for the promotion of their general wel-
fare and the protection of their individual as well as their collective rights." Id. The
surprising idea, apparently, was the individual rights protection, not the unquestioned
protection of collective rights.
37. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
38. Hurvitz, American Labor Law and the Doctrine of Entrepreneurial Property Rights: Boy-
cotts, Courts, and the Juridical Reorientation of 1886-1895, 8 IND. REL. L.J. 307, 315 (1986).
For another excellent study of forgotten legal protections for union activity, demonstrat-
ing early awareness that union organizing promoted claims going beyond a view of each
individual's labor as a commodity, see Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to
Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1071 (1987).
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much more group activity. As Hurvitz and other legal historians
have recently demonstrated, judges were anything but formalistic as
they began to ad-lib the concept of entrepreneurial property rights
meriting judicial protection. 9
Even when the Supreme Court began to apply first amendment
protections to the states in the 1920s, it still seemed easy forJustice
Van Devanter and a nearly unanimous Court to uphold New York's
conviction in New York ex reL. Bryant v. Zimmerman of a Ku Klux Klan
officer for his group's failure to disclose its membership list.4" This
all-but-forgotten decision has never been expressly repudiated. Cu-
riously, in the course of his celebration of the renewed recognition
of freedom of association and freedom from disclosure in the
39. See, e.g., Hurvitz, supra note 38, at 324-28, discussing State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273,
9 A. 559 (1887), in which the Supreme Court of Vermont upheld the indictment of
members of the National Stonecutters' Union for criminal conspiracy. The union mem-
bers were found to have belittled, threatened to disgrace (by identifying scabs), and to
drive away nonunion workers. Justice Powers found the union action inconsistent with a
common-law conception of the law of the land, "with every principle ofjustice that per-
meates the law under which we live." Id. at 286, 9 A. at 567. A more specific legislative
provision therefore was not found necessary. See aLso, e.g., State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 7 1,
74, 8 A. 890, 894-95 (1887) (properly left to court to determine if conspiracy was "mor-
ally wrong" or "detrimental to the public weal."); Brace Brothers v. Evans, 5 Pa. C. 163,
171 (1888), reported in 3 RAILWAY & CORP. L.J. 561, 564 (1888) (the very use of the word
"boycott" a threat that could properly be enjoined). As Rutgers Law ProfessorJim Pope
pointed out, in 1916 the United States Commission on Industrial Relations endorsed a
constitutional amendment to protect "the unlimited right of individuals to form associa-
tions, not for the sake of profit but for the advancement of their individual and collective
interest." FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
S. Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916). See generally J. ATLESON, VALUES AND
ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983); V. CONNER, THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR
BOARD (1983): C. ToMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND
THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985); Avery, Images of Vio-
lence in LaborJurisprudence: The Regulation of Picketing and Boycotts under the Anti-
trust Laws, 1890-1921 (1988) (manuscript on file with author); Forbath, The Ambiguities of
Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 767; Soifer, The Paradox
of Paternalism and Laissez-faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5
LAw & HIST. REV. 249, 268-279 (1986).
40. 278 U.S. 63 (1928). New York's "Walker Law" of 1923 required every "mem-
bership corporation" or "unincorporated association having a membership of twenty or
more persons" that required an oath for membership to file a sworn copy of its oath,
constitution, by-laws, rules, regulations and "a roster of its membership and a list of its
officers . . .." Id. at 66. The law specifically exempted labor unions and benevolent
orders mentioned in the benevolent orders law. Justice Van Devanter's majority opin-
ion sustained the law against attack based on privileges and immunities, id. at 71, due
process, id. at 72, and equal protection, id. at 73, by a member of the Ku Klux Klan who
had been convicted and jailed for his knowing membership in a group that did not com-
ply with the law. Justice McReynolds alone dissented, and he said he did so on jurisdic-
tional grounds. Id. at 77 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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NAACP decisions of the late 1950s,4" even such a giant as Harry
Kalven basically punted when he discussed the Bryant decision.4 2
He appeared to claim tautologically that it was acceptable to force
the Nazis to disclose their membership because they might thereby
be deterred from illegal activity. 43 This was an unsatisfactory way to
distinguish the 1928 Ku Klux Klan case from the NAACP cases and,
for that matter, from the troublesome decisions in the wake of Mc-
Carthyism that upheld, as late as 1961, the requirement that the
Communist Party reveal its membership."
The first clear Supreme Court victory for a freedom of associa-
tion claim did not come until 1937. In Dejonge v. Oregon,45 Chief
Justice Hughes's opinion for the Court reversed a conviction for as-
sisting in a meeting sponsored by an organization that advocated
illegal means to bring about political change. Hughes wrote, "The
right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech
and free press and is equally fundamental."4 That these strong
words were not the product of a slip of the judicial pen was made
clear when Hughes added that these rights cannot be denied "with-
out violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice
41. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v.
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 515 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
42. H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 91-94 (1965).
43. Id. at 94-95. Kalven wrote: "Alabama presumably could not directly seek to in-
hibit membership in the NAACP; New York presumably could inhibit membership in the
Klan." Id.
44. Id. In Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
367 U.S. 1 (1961), Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion upheld forced disclosure be-
cause the Subversive Activities Control Board had a reasonable basis to inquire about
the danger of "a world-wide integrated movement which employs every combination of
possible means, peaceful and violent, domestic and foreign, overt and clandestine, to
destroy the government itself ...." Id. at 96.
Justice Black's dissent in that case, along with his similarly vigorous dissent in re-
lated decisions, see, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109. 134 (1959), mark
some of the very best innings for this obvious Hall of Famer. Black asserted that ban-
ning an association, whether political or not, is "a fateful moment in the history of a free
country," 367 U.S. at 137; he castigated the idea he perceived in the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Act of "Government .. .as a paternal guardian." Id. at 139. Black called
the Sedition Act of 1798 "one of the greatest blots" in American history, id. at 155, and
he warned against beliefs such as that held by arch-Federalist Harrison Gray Otis that
"[t]he spirit of association . . . is a dangerous thing in a free government, and ought
carefully to be watched." Id. at 161. Instead, Black asserted, "The creation of public
opinion by groups, organizations, societies, clubs, and parties has been and is a neces-
sary part of our democratic society." Id. at 167.
45. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
46. Id. at 364.
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which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions."47 Still, at
least in retrospect, Dejonge looks like an easy case; Hughes's lan-
guage seems tied to the political nature of the association, which
might well be protected independent of any freedom of assembly
claim.
B. Thomas v. Collins
The crunch came in 1945 in Thomas v. Collins,48 a decision that
merits close attention, though it generally receives little notice to-
day. In contrast to the formal binary categories in contemporary
decisions dealing with freedom of association, Justice Rutledge's
majority opinion in Thomas is rich in dynamic, relational language.
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,4 9 for example, Justice Brennan
found that the Jaycees' exclusion of women fell right between the
"I's": the protected categories of intimate or instrumentally expres-
sive association.5 °
By contrast, listen to Rutledge's tone as he protects a union
leader from the contempt sentence imposed for ignoring an ex parte
judicial order to follow Texas's licensing procedure for paid union
solicitors. 5 ' The Court discerned both an unconstitutional prior re-
47. Id.
48. 323 U.S. 516 (1945). A notable precursor was Hague v. Committee for Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 512 (1939) (city officials forbidden to interfere with speeches and
assemblies publicizing the National Labor Relations Act). Justices Black, Hughes, and
Roberts viewed the rights involved as privileges of national citizenship, id. at 514, 532;
Justices Stone and Reed anchored the rights in the first amendment, applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 519.
49. 468 U.S. 609, 617-29 (1984) (Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT.
§ 363.03(3) (1982), compelling United States Jaycees to accept women as regular mem-
bers held not to abridge either the male members' freedom of intimate association or
freedom of expressive association).
50. 468 U.S. at 617-29. I applaud the result, incidentally, but find Brennan's reason-
ing strained at best, though not nearly as unconvincing as the reasoning rejecting free-
dom of association claims in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983);
Runyon v. McCary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). See also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash-
ington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983), to say nothing of such disparate decisions as Lyng v. Inter-
national Union, UAW, 108 S. Ct. 1184 (1988); Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987);
and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). For further discussion of Hodl, Lyng, and
ConnicA, see infra notes 87-90, 97-13 1, & 140-150 and accompanying text.
51. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 518. R.J. Thomas was president of the International Union,
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implements Workers (UAW), a vice presi-
dent of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), id. at 520, and one of the coun-
try's most influential labor leaders. In 1943, the year Thomas came to Texas to solicit
for union members, for example, President Roosevelt put him on a special five-person
labor commission created to deal with labor disruptions (and perhaps to co-opt the
political thrust of the left) during World War 11. See generally A. PREIS, LABOR'S GIANT
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straint on Thomas's speech and an unconstitutional limitation on
the right of Thomas and his audience to hold a public meeting.52
Rutledge wrote:
It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to free-
dom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty
with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition for redress of grievance. All these, though not
identical, are inseparable. They are cognate rights... and
therefore are united in the First Article's assurance.5 3
The Thomas decision, which recognized "a national right, feder-
ally guaranteed . . . [to] some modicum of freedom of thought,
speech and assembly which all citizens of the Republic may exercise
throughout its length and breadth,"54 is important for several
reasons.
First, Rutledge swept beyond previous opinions protecting
political and religious groups when he noted that the first amend-
ment "gives freedom of mind the same security as freedom of con-
science." ' 55 The Court in Thomas also insisted that the rights of
petition and assembly are not limited to religious or political mat-
ters, just as the rights of free speech and a free press "are not con-
fined to any field of human interest. "56 Moreover, in according "the
great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First
Amendment" a "preferred place" in the constitutional scheme, 57
Rutledge directly attacked the old states' rights limitations on the
scope of those freedoms. Finally, Rutledge emphasized that the
rights of speaker and audience, association and members, are
"[n]ecessarily correlative ' 58 and broad enough to include private as
well as public gatherings, economic as well as political subjects, and
passionate opinions as well as factual statements. 59
STEPS (1964). Thomas traveled to Bay Town, Texas, to address the oil workers there
and specifically to challenge a 1943 Texas statute that required licensing of paid union
solicitors. Id. at 520-21. (The statute is set out, and accepted as intended to protect the
laboring class, in Ex parte Thomas, 141 Tex. 591, 174 S.W.2d 958 (1943)). Thomas
made it a point to address "one Pat O'Sullivan, a nonunion man in the audience," and to
urge him by name to join the Oil Workers Union. 323 U.S. at 522-23.
52. 323 U.S. at 532. The Court held that the statute curtailed their rights of free
speech and free assembly in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments. Id.
53. Id. at 530.
54. Id. at 543.
55. Id. at 531.
56. 323 U.S. at 531.
57. Id. at 530.
58. Id. at 534.
59. Id.
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The vital importance of the Thomas decision, however, is in its
unified approach to first amendment rights. Because rights of
speech and assembly are "cognate," and rights of speaker and audi-
ence are "correlative," Thomas adopted a structural approach to first
amendment rights nearly forgotten today. The Thomas three
"C's"-cognate first amendment rights, contextual sensitivity, and
most strikingly today, correlative rights of the union, its members
and its officials-starkly contrast with the instrumental focus of
more recent freedom of association decisions. What happened to
this recognition that unions, for example, have important freedom
of association rights themselves? I can offer a few speculations.
C. Ghostly Footnotes in the Sands of Time
In 1900 Frederic W. Maitland published his own translation of
the German scholar Otto Gierke's Political Theories of the Middle
Ages."o In his wonderful introduction, Maitland traced the notion of
corporate personality in England, Germany, and Italy back to Ro-
man law roots.6 t Maitland was particularly concerned with "a mid-
dle region where a sociology emulous of the physical sciences
discourses of organs and organicism and social tissue, and cannot
sever by sharp lines the natural history of the state-group from the
natural history of other groups. " 62 He noted with characteristic dry
wit that the combination of English insularity with the advantages of
Empire "facilitated . . . a certain thoughtlessness or poverty of
ideas."16' The English were quick to accept a
unicellular State, and at a critical time they were not too
well equipped with tried and traditional thoughts which
would meet the case of Ireland or of some communities,
commonwealths, corporations in America which seemed to
have wills-and hardly fictitious wills-of their own, and
which became State and United States. 64
Picking up on Maitland's challenge, Harold Laski first achieved
fame in the United States when he asserted, in the Harvard Law Re-
view in 1916, that corporate forms have their own personalities.65
60. 0. GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (F.W. Maitland trans.
1900).
61. Id. at vii-xiv.
62. Id. at xi.
63. Id. at x.
64. 0. GIERKE, supra note 60, at x (footnote omitted).
65. Laski, The Personality of Associations. 29 HARV. L. REV. 404 (1916). For an intri-
guing reinterpretation of changes in the imagery of corporations in the late nineteenth
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Eulogizing the legal philosopher Morris Raphael Cohen in 1948,
however, Laski credited Cohen for ultimately convincing Laski of
the error of his youthful ways in "taking a side which was bound to
have reactionary results."6 6 Cohen, according to Laski, helped ex-
tricate him from a stream muddied by the "torrent of mysticism" of
German neo-Hegelians. 67 Without getting our feet wet in such dan-
gerous toney waters, or speculating about why Laski was so insistent
on distancing himself from German thinkers in 1948, we might find
it worthwhile to consider briefly what the curmudgeonly Cohen had
to say in his once-famous Communal Ghosts essay. 68
Cohen began his argument by noting, "A certain awe for the
word social is one of the outstanding phenomena of current intellec-
tual life." '69 Even without a detailed historical sense of the repeated
ebb and flow in popular enthusiasm for community, it is striking to
find evidence, in the very way Cohen described his target in 1919, of
the cyclical quality of our intellectual fads. 70 Cohen defined the is-
sue in controversy as "the extent to which the principle of unity
should be hypostatized or reified"; he expressed a wish to say
"thingified." 7'
What followed was a trenchant discussion of different kinds of
unity-synthetic, chemical, and biologic-all of which Cohen con-
ceded actually characterize diverse human associations in diverse
ways.72 Indeed, what today is most striking about Cohen's essay is
that he explicitly acknowledged that "every group has distinctive
group marks" and that "there is something uniting the different in-
dividuals so that they act differently from what they would if they
were not so interdependent . . . ."" But this concession gives away
the whole game. Through it, despite himself, Cohen acknowledges
the power of ghosts. Ancient battles over corporate personality turn
out to produce near consensus about the reality of groupness.
If a hard-boiled rationalist such as Morris Raphael Cohen-a
century, see Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, in CORPO-
RATIONS AND SOCIETY 12 (W. Samuels & A.S. Miller eds. 1987).
66. Laski, Morris Cohen's Approach to Legal Philosophy, 15 U. CHt. L. REV. 575, 578
(1948).
67. Id.
68. M. COHEN, supra note 18.
69. Id. at 386.
70. See R. NISBET, COMMUNITY AND POWER (1962) (originally published as R. NISBET,
THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY (1953)); R.J. WILSON, IN QUEST OF COMMUNITY: SOCIAL
PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1860-1920 (1970).
71. M. COHEN, supra note 18, at 390.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 388.
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man whose greatest contribution, according to Laski, was to "push
out of the road a good deal of useless and, not seldom, pretentious
lumber that stood in the way of clear understanding" 74 -recognized
the relational kinetic quality of "group marks" and distinctive group
power to influence individual conduct, the issue of whether "per-
sonality" is the appropriate terminology for the ghost seems almost
irrelevant, not even basic to the important issue of collective respon-
sibility that, with tragic prescience, concerned Cohen and Laski. But
their debate does starkly illuminate the extent to which lawyers and
judges still insist on the gnostic power of naming static individuals.
As a matter of constitutional law today-with a few narrow excep-
tions such as heterosexual couples, explicitly political associations,
and the NAACP most of the time-conglomerations of individuals
are treated as if they simply and accurately reflect the mere sums of
their individual parts. We do not even admit that there are "distinc-
tive group marks." What happened?
D. A Brief Interlude for Historical Speculation
The virtual disappearance until recently of the idea that groups
sometimes have their own claim to rights, as illustrated by Rut-
ledge's opinion in Thomas v. Collins,75 is striking. Having finally ac-
knowledged that unions have their own first amendment rights, for
example, the Supreme Court later, in the post-World War II period,
began to regard unions as only synecdoches for individuals. This is
neither the time nor the place to elaborate or footnote my specula-
tion about why. I will offer a few guesses, only in part because law-
yers like to divide everything into multiple units in order to appear
to conquer.
First, there was important disaffection, even within the New
Deal, with the corporatist first phase of the alphabet agency ap-
proach. Odious comparisons to Mussolini's fascist brand of syndi-
calism helped to underscore a pervasive American distaste for
government recognition of groups. Judicial opinions and lawyers'
arguments are full of references to the contrast between good old
American individualism and the treatment of people in old world
group terms.76
Moreover, the internecine warfare within unions over the role
74. Laski, supra note 66, at 576.
75. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
76. This story is still to be fully told, but parts of it may be found in P. IRONS, THE
NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982); E. PURCELL, JR., THE CRIsIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCI-
ENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973).
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of communists during the height of the Cold War was messy
enough, and sufficiently bitter, to alert courts to the problematic na-
ture of trying to hang rights on groups themselves. It was almost a
reprise of the battle, more than a century earlier, between congrega-
tionalists and unitarians over which group could rightfully claim
church property." Judges generally believed it the better part of
valor to hide behind pious judicial incantations about neutrality. 78
Popular perception of the danger posed by communist cells and
cadres helps explain why lawyers and judges sought refuge in legal
process values and found solace in cleansing the autonomous indi-
vidual of any traces of the individual's group marks. Lawyers and
even bureaucrats who were not lawyers found it delightfully easy to
squeeze the discontented in the passive vises of the requirements of
individual standing, formal representation rules, the need to prove
bad motive in one's own discrimination claim, and so forth.
Focusing on the individual also neatly taps into popular nostal-
gia. It evokes myths about ruggedly independent cowboys and self-
helping entrepreneurs. If groups are associated with radical threats,
individuals can be constituted as a "good guy" counterpoint. This
technique allows the lawyer to exercise and find support for the role
of professional conservative, without actually becoming concerned
with history.
Finally, much of the legal opposition to Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion7 9 sought respectability by claiming that the right of freedom of
association necessarily entailed the freedom not to associate with
blacks.8" It followed, according to Herbert Wechsler as well as nu-
merous lesser legal lights, 8 that although the effect might be unde-
sirable, it was constitutionally inappropriate to invade a decision by
77. For a vivid description of these church schisms in antebellum Massachusetts, see
L. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 29-42 (1957). For a
historical overview of various attempts to settle disputes outside of law in America, seeJ.
AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW?: RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOtrr LAWYERS (1983).
78. Judge Sobeloff's famous profile in lawyerly courage stands in sharp and noble
contrast to our usual professional timidity, which often is couched in terms of benevo-
lent neutrality or benign neglect. As Bob Cover put it, "Prudential deference . . . is the
great temptation, and the final sin of judging." Folktales of Jusltice, supra note 9, at 190.
79. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally Arendt, Reflections on Little Rock, 6 DISSENT 45
(1955); Arendt, The Crisis in Education, 25 PARTISAN REV. 493 (1958).
80. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34
(1959).
81. See, e.g., R. KLUcER, SIMPLEJUSTICE 544-46 (1975) (John W. Davis's argument for
South Carolina). But see Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notesfor a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473
(1972).
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a group that defined itself by excluding others on the basis of race.8 2
Though many believe that argument retains some force to this
day,8" guilt by association with segregationists helps explain the di-
minished capacity of the independent right of freedom of associa-
tion as it was developed in Thomas v. Collins. 4
V. SO WHAT?
So what? What difference would an independent right of free-
dom of association make in what we ironically call the "real world"
of litigation? I will suggest only a few of the many categories of
cases in which, if my proposed independent right were taken seri-
ously, the outcomes should be different. (I am not such a believer in
the autonomy of the law, nor such a disbeliever in the wily word-
smithery of good lawyers and judges, as to claim boldly that it actu-
ally will make a difference.) But, as Morris Raphael Cohen put it in
his own mystical moment, "words are most potent influences in de-
termining thought as well as action."8 "
A. A Sampler of Recent Decisions about Native American Tribal Rights
Claims by Native Americans provide the easy examples-en-
tirely too easy for anyone with a sense of tragic history.8 6 Still, I find
it astonishing that there were no dissents in Hodel v. Irving, a virtu-
ally unnoticed property case, when the Supreme Court found un-
constitutional a 1983 federal statute that attempted to deal with the
serious public problem of the "extreme fractionation of Indian
lands."17
Representatives of decedents, who could have but did not
82. Wechsler, supra note 80, at 34.
83. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-83 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
84. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
85. M. COHEN, supra note 18, at 389.
86. See, e.g., Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 3; Garet,
Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1035-43 (1983);
Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Amercanizing
the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219.
87. 107 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (1987). Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, concurred separately, id. at 2084, in order to do battle with Justice Scalia,
joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Powell, who also concurred, id. at 2084-85,
but claimed that the Court's willingness to uphold the minimal property claims involved
undercut the entertaining decision in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (uphold-
ing the Eagle Protection Act's ban on any sale of artifacts containing eagle feathers, on
the theory that the value of such artifacts was not entirely destroyed, since they might be
displayed at roadside stands for which admission might be charged). Id. at 2085. Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice White, also concurred separately in Hodel. Id. at 2085-93.
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otherwise devise their land, challenged the congressional plan that
provided that their tiny "fractionated" land holdings would escheat
to the tribe. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court emphasized
the importance of an individual's vital "right to pass on property,"
and found the de minimis examples of that right involved in the case
to be obviously superior to the congressional solution, though she
conceded that "consolidation of Indian lands in the Tribe benefits
the members of the Tribe."88 In holding that such consolidation
constituted a taking of an individual's property right, the Court pro-
vided a tragic centennial observance of the Dawes Severalty Act of
1887,89 through which it became federal policy to break up the
tribes on the premise that tribal units deprived Native Americans of
that "selfishness which is at the bottom of civilization."9 The so-
called conservative Justices never hinted that they had qualms as
they intervened rather actively to protect the admittedly attenuated
property claims of individuals from clear and very recent action by
the Congress recognizing the relational quality of tribal property.
As if to demonstrate that the Court's insensitivity to tribal inter-
ests in Hodel v. Irving was no fluke, the Court has since determined
that there was no constitutional barrier to building six miles of
paved highway across a national forest and through the ground
most sacred to several Northwest Indian tribes, despite the fact that
the road-building and logging operations undertaken by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, against the recommendation of a study it had
commissioned, "could have devastating effects on traditional Indian
religious practices." 9 ' Justice O'Connor explained for the majority
88. 107 S. Ct. at 2083-84.
89. Dawes Severalty Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 381 (1982)).
90. A. DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN 21-22 (1940) (quoting 1885 BOARD OF
INDIAN COMM'RS ANN. REP. 90-91 (statement of Sen. Henry L. Dawes)). As Milner Ball
pointed out, late in Thomas Jefferson's life his goal was the division of the country into
wards "until it ends in the administration of every man's farm by himself." See M. Ball,
The Promise and Deficiency of the Story of Origins in American Constitutional Jurispru-
dence (1988) (manuscript on file with author);Jefferson, Letter toJoseph C. Cabell, in THE
LIVE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 660 (A. Koch & W. Peden eds.
1944).
91. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1326
(1988). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had predicted that the road would "virtually
destroy the Indians' ability to practice their religion," see Northwest Cemetery Protective
Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 1986), but Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion argued that, even if this prediction proved accurate, "[t]he First Amendment
must apply to all citizens' alike, and it can give to none of them a veto over public pro-
grams that do not prohibit the free exercise of religion." 108 S. Ct. at 1327. Justice
Brennan,joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, dissented, and Justice Kennedy did
not take part. Id. at 1330.
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that "[t]he crucial word in the constitutional text is 'prohibit.' "92
Because nothing was "prohibited" in building a road, no constitu-
tional- right was impinged. Moreover, she insisted, "[h]owever
much we might wish that it were otherwise, government simply
could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's reli-
gious needs and desires.""3 This lowest common denominator ap-
proach-all citizens have only the rights of every citizen-ignores
history and destroys special, communal claims that are particularly
compelling in the case of Native Americans, without even reaching
any religious claims Indian tribes may make. Justice O'Connor even
added what she apparently took to be the private property law
clincher: "Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the
area . . . do not divest the Government of its right to use what is,
after 'all, its land."9 4
B. The Rational Relationship Test for Freedom of Association Claims:
Lyng v. International Union, UAW
Less dramatic, perhaps more mainstream examples of how sen-
sitivity to an independent right of freedom of association would
yield different and quite clearly better results include a recent hold-
ing that allows the exclusion of the NAACP Legal Defense and Edu-
cation Fund, Inc., from the general federal charity drive among
federal employees on a "mere rationality" basis of review,9 5 and
several decisions allowing the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) virtu-
ally unchecked discretion in its decisions concerning tax-exempt
status.96
Yet the most significant of all the recent decisions that depreci-
ate the importance of freedom of association is Lyng v. International
Union, UA W.9 7 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981
(OBRA) 9 8-an ActJustice Stevens appropriately called a "vast piece
92. 108 S. Ct. at 1326.
93. Id. at 1327.
94. Id. (emphasis in original). This is reminiscent of President Reagan's famous ar-
gument during the 1980 New Hampshire primary that "I paid for this microphone." It
merely amounts, however, to a restatement of the idea that the greater power necessarily
includes the lesser power. For further discussion see infra note 113.
95. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788
(1985).
96. For a discussion of these decisions, see Soifer, supra note 12, at 662-64. See, e.g.,
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
97. 108 S. Ct. 1184 (1988).
98. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 109, 95 Stat. 357, 361
(1981).
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of hurriedly enacted legislation" 99 -provided that no household
could become eligible for food stamps or receive an increase in its
food stamp allotment while any member of the household was on
strike.'0 0 District Court Judge Louis Oberdorfer declared this
amendment to the Food Stamp Act'' unconstitutional on the
ground that it interfered with the strikers' freedom of association
with their families, unions, and fellow union members.' 02 He also
held that Congress had unconstitutionally restricted the first amend-
ment right of strikers to express themselves free from government
coercion and had denied them equal protection by classifying solely
on the basis of animus, by treating strikers significantly worse than
employees who voluntarily quit their jobs, and by placing the onus
of the decision to strike directly on the families of the strikers.' 0 3
Through poignant and detailed affidavits, the unions and indi-
viduals who challenged the food stamp restriction presented uncon-
tested evidence of the hardship wrought by the congressional
action.'1 4 Nevertheless, Justice White's majority opinion asserted
that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the statute probably had
no effect.' 0 5 In any event, the Court noted, the statute does not
"order" individuals to refrain from dining together nor does it in
any way "directly and substantially interfere with a family's living
arrangements."'0 6 The Court thereby ignored the ignominious
99. Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 867 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
100. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 109, 95 Stat. 357, 361
(1981).
101. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2027 (1982).
102. International Union, UAW v. Lyng, 648 F. Supp. 1234 (D.D.C. 1986); Interna-
tional Union, UAW v. Block, 648 F. Supp. 1241 (D.D.C. 1985).
103. Lyng, 648 F. Supp. at 1239-40; Block, 648 F. Supp. at 1251, 1254-55.
104. Some of the affidavits were summarized in Judge Oberdorfer's opinion granting
summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The government agreed that the strikers had to
choose among "leaving their households, abandoning a strike by returning to work,
quitting their jobs, or attempting to persuade their unions to call off the strike." Lyng,
648 F. Supp. at 1236. Some strikers remained disqualified even though their employers
had replaced them and therefore foreclosed any chance to return. Judge Oberdorfer
indicated that the 1981 House Agriculture Committee report mentioned that the reason
the amendment was rejected previously was because it was "the non-neutral act of pres-
suring the worker to abandon the strike ..... Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 106, 97th
Cong., Ist Sess. 142).
105. Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 108 S. Ct. 1184, 1189 (1988) (quoting Lyng
v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986)).
106. Id. (holding that statutory definition of "household" for food stamp purposes
satisfied rational relationship test)). Justice White asserted that Castillo "foreclosed" the
claims of associational rights asserted in the striker-food stamp case. 108 S. Ct. at 1189.
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choice between family and union loyalty the statute forced upon
people.
The Court's distinction between direct and indirect burdens is
reminiscent of the dichotomous judicial approach to interstate com-
merce and to federalism in the years before the constitutional
revolution of 1937.107 But the core concern within the majority's
effort to distinguish direct and indirect harms quickly became clear.
Amid rhetoric declaring that "[tihe Constitution does not permit"
any other result and that "discretion about how best to spend
money to improve the general welfare is lodged in Congress rather
than the courts," White announced that "[w]e have little trouble in
concluding that Sec. 109 is rationally related to the legitimate gov-
ernment objective of avoiding undue favoritism to one side or the
other in private labor disputes."'
White used a footnote to concede, as the precedents suggest he
had to do, that associational rights may be "abridged even by gov-
ernment actions that do not directly restrict individuals' ability to
associate freely," as well as by frontal assaults."0 9 But White also
asserted that "[e]xposing the members of an association to physical
and economic reprisals or to civil liability merely because of their
membership in that group poses a much greater danger to the exer-
cise of associational freedoms than does withdrawal of a govern-
ment benefit based not on membership in an organization but
merely for the duration of one activity that may be undertaken by
that organization."" 0 This is blatant double-talk. In translation,
this circular line of reasoning seems to mean that the Court simply
will take judicial notice of the level of harm to associational rights
107. See generally Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936) (Congress lacked
power over coal-mining); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (Congress
lacked power over agriculture); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (Con-
gress lacked power to regulate indirect effect on interstate commerce of child labor); P.
IRONS, supra note 76. The direct/indirect approach was vigorously attacked and rejected
by Justice Cardozo and by a majority of the Court and it has nearly disappeared-at least
for the moment-from explicit Supreme Court decisions about federalism and the con-
stitutional reach of the commerce clause. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Nevertheless, the approach is dear to lawyers and still ech-
oes mightily within the doctrinal morass in current labor law concerning such matters as
boycotts and handbilling. See generally Harper, The Consumers Emerging Right to Boycott:
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware and Its Implications for American Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J.
409 (1984); Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of First Amendment Values: Two Rungs and a BlacA
Hole, 1 I HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189 (1984).
108. International Union, 108 S. Ct. at 1193, 1192.
109. Id. at 1190 n.5 (citing Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960); Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972)).
110. Id.
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threatened by particular governmental action. On one hand, there
are serious, judicially-cognizable threats to freedom of association
in the forced disclosure of membership lists and in a large damage
award imposed because of an association's lengthy boycott of all the
white merchants in town."' These intrusions may be distinguished
by judicial fiat, however, from pressure that is even more basic-
hunger-imposed on a striker and a striker's family because of par-
ticipation in, or even failure to renounce, a strike." 2 This restric-
tion is somehow considered neither punishment nor a significant
burden on freedom of association. Apparently, the Court conceived
of food stamps as mere government largess. As long as the govern-
ment decision is couched in terms of "neutrality," food stamps can
be doled out or cut off for any reason, for no reason, or even, appar-
ently, for the purposes of penalizing an unpopular group.
The Court unquestioningly accepted Congress's claim that it
sought to be neutral. "Strikers and their union would be much bet-
ter off if food stamps were available," the majority acknowledged,
"but the strikers' right of association does not require the Govern-
ment to furnish funds to maximize the exercise of that fight."' 13
1I1. The Court referred here to NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
919-920 (1982), and to NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
International Union, 108 S. Ct. at 1190 n.5. Both decisions involved the NAACP, of
course, and neither was a model of clarity about the extent of the freedom of association
right embraced by the Court or about why traditional limitations such as standing and
state action requirements were relaxed in these cases. In this respect, these decisions
seem to be akin to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), though-
unfortunately in my view-they so far have not shared the capacity of that decision to
grow far beyond its initial very sympathetic fact pattern.
112. See generally Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1
(1964); Harper, supra note 107. But see International Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO
v. Allied Int'l, 456 U.S. 212, 226-27 (1982) (prohibition of secondary political picketing)
and compare with DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
108 S. Ct. 1392, 1404 (1988) (29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982), construed to avoid first
amendment problems which would result were the statute read to prohibit secondary
handbilling).
113. International Union, 108 S. Ct. at 1190. The majority also conceded that [ilt
would be difficult to deny that this statute works at least some discrimination against
strikers and their households," id. at 1192, but did not consider that discrimination to be
of constitutional significance. Instead the Court adopted the idea that the greater power
automatically includes the exercise of any degree of lesser power. This idea seems to be
increasingly popular with the current Court, see, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2979 (1986) (government power to ban
gambling necessarily includes government power to exercise lesser power of banning
advertising of gambling in newspapers targeted at local population); Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980) (government may influence an indigent pregnant woman's
constitutionally protected fundamental right to choose about abortion by subsidizing
childbirth, but not abortion, since government need not provide any comprehensive
medical care). Cf. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517,
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The legislature is entitled "not to subsidize" even the exercise of a
fundamental right.' 1 4 This subsidization view is a dangerous exten-
sion of the purported neutrality the Court accepted in the abortion-
funding decisions. 1 5 Moreover, the Court sought to distinguish
precedents invalidating unconstitutional conditions.' 6 Apparently
the "governmental obligation of neutrality"' 17 may sometimes re-
quire relatively close scrutiny when fundamental rights, such as
those originating in the establishment and free exercise clauses of
the first amendment, are at stake. Freedom of association claims,
however, despite their similar first amendment origin, are afforded
much lower, indeed negligible, status.
In other words, there is neutrality and then there is neutrality.
Sometimes the Constitution is said to oblige the Court to defer to
strained, even false, claims of neutrality, as in the striker amend-
ment to the Food Stamp Act.' 18 But sometimes neutrality is said to
oblige the Court to consider carefully whether the government is
517 (1892) (Holmes. J.) ("The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.").
An older, even less appealing source for the greater power-lesser power argument
may be found in what was probably the leading rationale for slavery in the 1600-1700s,
traceable to Roman roots, that slaves were captives in war and therefore could be killed.
Merely enslaving people was actually favorable treatment, it was said, clearly included
within the greater power to kill them. See generally D.B. DAvIs, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY
IN WESTERN CULTURE 83-121 (1966); W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN Arri-
TUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1968); E.S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMER-
ICAN FREEDOM (1975). For a demurrer concerning the reality of the justification in
Graeco-Roman culture, see M.I. FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY AND MODERN IDEOLOGY 82-92
(1980).
114. International Union, 108 S. Ct. at 1190 (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Represen-
tation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983)).
115. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977).
116. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (denial of unemployment
benefits to one refusing on religious grounds to work on Saturday held to violate free
exercise clause).
117. International Union, 108 S. Ct. at 1191 n.7 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 475 n.8).
118. Justice Marshall's dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, convinc-
ingly demonstrated nonneutrality in several different ways. Marshall used legislative his-
tory, excerpts from the affidavits of strikers, and responses by the government in the
course of the litigation to show that the statutory intent, and its sometimes devastating
actual effect, was intended to punish strikers and to force them into hard choices such as
between living with their families and being loyal to their unions. Moreover, Marshall
made the important point that "loin a deeper level," the neutrality argument "reflects a
profoundly inaccurate view of the relationship of the modem federal government to the
various parties to a labor dispute." 108 S. Ct. at 1198. He pointed to tax subsidies,
Small Business Administration loans, bankruptcy law protections, and similar advan-
tages afforded management in strike situations. Id.
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really being neutral.' The Court brusquely rejected the relevance
of a decision that invalidated a limitation on food stamps aimed at
punishing hippies on the ground that "a bare congressional desire
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest."' 20 White claimed that Moreno merely re-
quired the usual, extremely deferential rational relationship test.' 2 '
In the context of the striker-food stamp amendment, this version of
neutrality is bizarre; it permits legislative action specifically designed
to punish members of an unpopular group for their constitutionally
protected group action.
Nevertheless, the Court would have us sympathize with the
plight of Congress. White asserted that "Congress was in a difficult
position when it sought to address the problems it identified." 12 2 It
is acceptable for Congress to be "[hiarder on strikers than on 'vol-
untary quitters,' " according to White, because "the concern about
neutrality in labor disputes does not arise with respect to those who,
for one reason or another, simply quit theirjobs."' 21 If you whine,
you cannot dine. But winos and others who, like Bartleby the Scriv-
ener, simply prefer not to work, those who just up and quit one fine
day, are treated much more kindly by a statute "rationally related to
the stated objective of neutrality."'12 4
Even putting to one side the dissenters' devastating critique of
such presumed neutrality, the majority's approach merits attention
for what it says and does not say about freedom of association. Two
points in Lyng help illustrate why an independent right is important
and how it would make a difference.
119. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274-79 (1979) (absolute pref-
erence for veterans for civil service jobs valid because it was not "inherently non-neu-
tral"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (three-pronged test developed to
measure crucial government neutrality regarding religion); Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 67 (1967) ("absolute neutrality" the essence of the first
amendment rule prohibiting content regulation).
120. Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (emphasis in original)
(invalidating restrictive definition of household for food stamp purposes clearly aimed at
"hippies").
121. International Union, 108. S. Ct. at 1192.
122. Id.
123. id. at 1193. Nevertheless, White was certain that "[ilt was no part of the pur-
poses of the Food Stamp Act to establish a program that would serve as a weapon in
labor disputes." Id. at 1192.
124. Id. at 1193. Having decided this, the majority mentioned but did not rely on
either the money-saving or aid-to-the-neediest rationales suggested by the government.
Id. at 1195-97. The first would virtually end review of restrictions in government pro-
grams, and the second cannot be supported given the eligibility criteria for the food
stamp program.
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First, the way the majority glibly brushed aside the freedom of
association right is revealing. White began by conceding that "[w]e
have recognized that 'one of the foundations of our society is the
right of individuals to combine with other persons in pursuit of a
common goal by lawful means.' "125 Within three paragraphs, how-
ever, he completed his discussion of freedom of association by rely-
ing upon an equal protection decision which had held that denial of
unemployment benefits to workers thrown out of work in a labor
dispute "does not involve any discernible fundamental interest." '126
Etymology to the contrary, freedom of association is a foundational
right, but not a fundamental right.' 27
In fact, freedom of association so lacked the qualities of a fun-
damental right that White simply segued into a discussion of tradi-
tional, toothless rational relationship review. Once the statute was
said to have "no substantial impact on any fundamental interest, '"128
the majority needed only to determine that strikers did not consti-
tute a suspect class. The very strong doctrinal presumption in favor
of legislative line-drawing sufficed. White's discussion of neutrality
illustrates how "one could get out of a premise all that one had put
into it."129 But I want to underscore not that particular silliness, nor
even its inconsistency within the genre of recent equal protection
125. International Law, 108 S. Ct. at 1189 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886, 933 (1982)).
126. Id. at 1191 (quoting Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S.
471, 489 (1977)).
127. How to resolve issues of what is, at bottom, fundamental in constitutional law, or
a suitable foundation for what we construct, remains in considerable doubt. The words
"foundation" and "fundamental" share the same derivation and once shared exactly the
same meaning. OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 493, 604 (1978). Moreover, as Connecti-
cut Law Professor Hugh Macgill pointed out, Boswell related that Dr. Johnson was once
met with great laughter when he stated that "the woman had a bottom of good sense,"
which Dr. Johnson then amended to proclaim, " 'I say the woman was fundamentally sensi-
ble.'" 4 BOSWELL'S LIFE OFJoHNsoN 114-15 (G. Hill ed. 1891) (emphasis in original).
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974), Justice Douglas's majority
opinion insisted that the village ban on groups of three or more unrelated by blood or
marriage sharing a household was constitutional because "[iut involves no 'fundamental'
right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as . . . the right of association .... " The
other fundamental rights Douglas sought to distinguish were voting, the right of access
to the courts, and rights of privacy. Id. at 7-8. Justice Marshall's dissent argued that
"deference does not mean abdication" when, as in the case of the Belle Terre zoning
ordinance, government action "infringe[s] upon fundamental constitutional rights." Id.
at 14. Justice Brennan also dissented, primarily on jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 12.
128. International Union, 108 S. Ct. at 1191-92.
129. Thomas Reed Powell is quoted to this effect, in turn quoting William Graham
Sumner. See Braeman, Thomas Reed Powell on the Roosevelt Court. 5 CONST. COMMENTARY
143, 145 (1988).
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analysis."' Rather, I am concerned about how glibly, and with what
destructive consequences, the court transplanted freedom of associ-
ation from the company it should keep with its first amendment
counterparts into a makeweight instrumental interest, an interest
that actually carries no weight at all.
If freedom of association properly were considered "one of the
foundations of our society," the union and family claims in Lyng v.
International Union, UA W surely require more careful scrutiny than
that afforded by the majority's extreme deference to government.' 3 '
As comparison to the native American decisions makes clear, the
current Court is hardly consistent in deciding when to defer to Con-
gress and when to intervene aggressively. If the Court were to heed
important, albeit not absolute claims made on behalf of freedom of
association, as Justice Rutledge did in Thomas v. Collins,'3 ' it would
sometimes reach different results. Perhaps more important, it
would surely begin to tell different tales and might help groups of
citizens seeking to grope together toward creating better traditions.
C. Nascent Groups: A Matter of Public Concern?
A significant element of the current legal confusion about
groups stems from habits of thought developed through the
bureaucratized approach used to categorize and regulate associa-
tions. We often sacrifice function to form. It now seems apparent,
for example, that workers made something of a Faustian bargain to
obtain the protections of concerted activity provided by the Wagner
Act. ' 3 The federal labor policy which we now take for granted
came at great cost to spontaneity and to older union customs, to
local control of organizing and of the use of political clout, and to an
array of organizing techniques outside the formal legal process. 3 4
130. White did not mention his own majority opinion in Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
v. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 450 (1985), which indicated that there should be
some bite in judicial consideration of whether similarly situated persons are treated alike
and whether differential treatment indicates that the true goal of government action is
illegitimate. See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
131. 108 S. Ct. at 1189-94. The majority relied on the extremely minimal scrutiny
proclaimed in, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), and
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
132. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
133. See, e.g.,J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw (1983);
C. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED
LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985); Kare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a
New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 IND. REL. LJ. 450, 458-68 (1981); Lynd,
Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1417 (1984).
134. See, e.g., P. IRoNS, supra note 76, at 203-71; D. MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL
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It is hardly surprising that the Supreme Court has struggled might-
ily in its recent flirtation with the relatively newfangled notion that
there is some federal constitutional protection for an individual's
property right in continued public employment. 3 5
What seems most directly to confound the Court in the realm of
public employment is the notion that custom, as well as formal state
or federal law, may determine when one has a "more than unilateral
expectation" ofjob security.' 36 The difficulty arises for three inter-
locking reasons. First, recent social and economic changes-rang-
ing from the diminished power of political parties and patronage to
altered public perceptions about how much harshness of life is to be
endured before seeking redress-have helped to change the legal
status of public employment.' 37 Second, the Court itself has begun
to extend limited first amendment protections into public sector
employment.' 38 Finally, and most relevant to our concern about
groups, giving weight to custom necessarily concedes that groups,
IN AMERICA: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF WORK, TECHNOLOGY AND LABOR STRUGGLES
(1979); C. TOMLINS, supra note 133, at 99-243; WORKING CLASS AMERICA: ESSAYS ON
LABOR, COMMUNITY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (M. Frisch & D. Walkowitz eds. 1983);
Klare,Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness,
62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
135. Compare, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282 (1986) (Justice
Powell wrote the plurality opinion, but he was joined only by then-Justice Rehnquist and
ChiefJustice Burger in Section IV, in which he stressed the impact of even a temporary
layoff of an employee and quoted an article that asserted that "the rights and expecta-
tions surrounding seniority make up what is probably the most valuable capital asset that
the worker 'owns,' worth even more than the current equity in his home." (quoting Fal-
Ion & Weiler, Conflicting Models of RacialJustice, 1984 SuP. CT. REV. i, 58)); Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (holding that "the 'bitter with the
sweet' approach misconceives the constitutional guarantee"); with, e.g., Arnett v. Ken-
nedy, 416 U.S. 134, 163 (1974) (holding that due process clause does not require any
higher expectancy ofjob retention than the right conferred not to be discharged except
for "cause" and conditioning the grant of that right by procedural limitations); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (holding that lack of contractual or tenure right
to re-employment, taken alone, does not defeat claim that nonrenewal of employment
contract violates free speech right under the first and fourteenth amendments); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 579 (1972) (holding that assistant professor at state uni-
versity who had no tenure rights to continued employment, and who was informed that
he would not be rehired after one academic year, did not have property interest pro-
tected by fourteenth amendment).
136. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
137. See, e.g., B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY (1984); L. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE
(1985); M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981).
138. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980) (assistant public defender
could not be discharged solely because of political beliefs); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
373 (1976) (public employment could not be conditioned on membership in or loyalty
to political party in power). But see Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 361 (1980) (uphold-
ing Air Force regulations requiring prior approval of commanding officers before circu-
lating petitions to Congress on military base); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v.
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but not isolated individuals, may and do establish understandings,
expectations, and reliances that have legal significance beyond the
individualistic paradigm of the employment-at-will labor contract.
Yet the Court fails to recognize the crucial role of organizing
within the workforce that is outside the formal realm of the National
Labor Relations Act 13 9 or of existing political parties. The Court's
failure to perceive the importance of constitutional protection for
nascent groups in particular helps to explain the disaster of Connick
V. Myers.' 40 In that decision, the majority determined that the effort
by Assistant District Attorney Sheila Myers's effort to solicit the
views of her fellow employees about how the office was being run
was an employee grievance presented outside normal channels.' 14
The decision to dismiss Myers for circulating a questionnaire "may
not be fair," the Court declared, but it was nonetheless not subject
to judicial review.' Justice White's majority opinion acknowl-
edged that the questionnaire Myers sent her co-workers surely was
not "totally beyond the protection of the First Amendment," yet
held that "a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to
review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency
allegedly in response to the employee's behavior."'' 43
If not to a federal court, where are people to go for legal vindi-
cation of such first amendment rights? A perspective that gives free-
dom of association its due and uses a structural rather than a
compartmentalizing approach to first amendment freedoms would
find constitutional protection for Myers in her questioning and or-
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973) (reaffirming limitation on
active participation by-civil servants in political parties).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
140. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
141. Id. at 154.
142. Id. at 146-47. Myers chose to circulate the questionnaire after she objected to a
transfer, was transferred anyway, and was told that her concerns about how the office
was being run "were not shared by others in the office." Id. at 141.
143. Id. at 147. The concession of a first amendment element in the case combined
with the majority's denial that federal courts ought to be open to such concerns boggles
the mind. The majority's position grows curiouser and curiouser, however, when one
learns that one of Myers's questions-the one her employer was particularly upset about
because it "would be damaging if discovered by the press," id. at 147---concerned pres-
sure to work in political campaigns, an issue which if substantiated would clearly violate
the Constitution. See cases discussed supra note 138. Cf. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977) (school teacher could be fired without reason, but not
for exercise of first amendment right). The Court segregated this question from all the
other issues it considered to be not of public concern. After doing so, the majority used
an explicit balancing test without any specific criteria and thereby determined that Myers
had raised only an unprotected employee grievance. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-54.
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ganizing. Freedom of association should be valued as a goal, not
merely as a troublesome means. White's unworkable and analyti-
cally indefensible test of whether Myers's speech was of "public con-
cern" thereby could have been avoided.' 4 4 A more realistic and
more appropriate first amendment test would not have required the
sharp line White attempted to draw between communications about
public concerns, which apparently even federal courts will protect,
and other matters, such as Myers's questionnaire, which was the
type of employee expression that "cannot be fairly considered as
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community."145
What makes the majority's crabbed view doubly appalling is the
way it denigrates the public as it spins out the unworkable conse-
quences of its wrong-headed premise that communication and or-
ganizing can take place in splendid, individualistic isolation. It
neither reflects the robust expressive activities of the era of the
framing of the Constitution, 46 nor makes logical sense. It is circu-
lar to argue on the one hand that Myers is not protected because
"the questionnaire, if released to the public, would convey no infor-
mation at all other than the fact that a single employee is upset with
the status quo," ' 4  and then to claim that Myers was fired because
"[q]uestions, no less than forcefully stated opinion and facts, carry
messages."14
By attempting to reduce Myers's questionnaire to "an employee
grievance concerning internal office policy,' 49 the Connick majority
protested too much. White asserted that "[aJlthough today the bal-
ance is struck for the government, this is no defeat for the first
amendment."' 5 ° It is more akin to a debacle. The explicit protec-
tion of labor law statutes ought not to be necessary to place Myers's
144. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-49.
145. Id. at 146. Not only did this statement of what "fairly" can be said gratuitously
insult the four dissenters-Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, id. at 156-but it required the majority to reverse the fact-finding of the district
court, upheld by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, on the grounds that "[tihe inquiry
into the protected status of speech is one of law, not fact. Thus, we are not bound to the
views of the District Court unless clearly erroneous." id. at 146 n.7.
146. See generally L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985); P. MATER, FROM RESIST-
ANCE TO REVOLUTION (1972); Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Lei, on Freedom of
Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795 (1985). But seeJ. REID, CONSTI-
TurioNAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986).
147. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148.
148. Id. at 152.
149. Id. at 154.
150. Id.
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organizing and communicating efforts within the "preferred posi-
tion" tradition articulated in Thomas v. Collins.15 1 A first amendment
approach sensitive to efforts to form groups, as well as striving to
allow groups to function as freely as possible most of the time,
would better reflect how we work, live, and learn.
The test I propose is similar to the one we use when freedom of
the press is at stake. The press certainly does not always win, but
the precedents suggest--quite appropriately in my view-that re-
strictions on or discriminatory treatment ofjournalists must be han-
dled in a gingerly fashion.' 5 ' Like the press, associations serve a
vital "checking value" in our society."'5 The form and function of
voluntary associations, for example, should not be left to the unbri-
dled discretion of government officials. My approach would affect
lower courts' treatment of such diverse recent issues as the licensing
of escort services in Las Vegas' 54 and the constitutionality of the
integrated bar in Wisconsin. 155 It would help provide a rationale for
151. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
152. See, e.g., Soifer, Freedom of the Press in the United States, in PRESS LAw IN MODERN
DEMOCRACiES 79 (P. Lahav ed. 1985); Melville B. Nimmer Symposium, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1331 (1987); Anderson, Media Success in the Supreme Court, (1987 Gannett Center for
Media Studies Working Paper).
153. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 523.
Eric Fromm probably overstated this important point a bit when he said that "[g]roups
which represent an idea in its purity and without compromise are the seedbeds of his-
tory; they keep the idea alive, regardless of the rate of progress it makes among the
majority." E. FROMM, THE REVOLUTION OF HOPE 160 (1968). See also Coates v. Cincin-
nati, 402 U.S. 611, 615, n.5 (1971) ("Our decisions establish that mere public intoler-
ance or animosity cannot be the basis for abridgement of [free assembly and
association]" (noting City of Toledo v. Sims, 14 Ohio Op. 2d 66, 69, 169 N.E.2d 516,
520 (1960), which pointed out that arrests and prosecutions under the loitering and
congregating statute at issue would have been effective against the patriots in front of
the Raleigh Tavern in Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1774)). But see Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct.
1157, 1168-69 (1988) (invalidating District of Columbia ban on displaying signs, but
upholding ban on congregating within 500 feet of a foreign embassy and refusing to
disperse when ordered to do so by police).
154. See, e.g., IDK, Inc. v. Clark County, 836 F.2d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 1988) (split
decision rejecting facial overbreadth, freedom of association challenge to licensing
scheme for commercial dating service in Las Vegas).
155. See, e.g., Levine v. Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 679 F. Supp. 1478, 1502 (W.D.
Wis. 1988) (Judge Crabb decision striking down Wisconsin integrated bar scheme on
freedom of association grounds).
I am certainly not suggesting that freedom of association claims should always pre-
vail. In the IDK case, for example, the fact that the dating service was obviously quite
commercial, along with the fact that the challenge to the statute presented no factual
context of abuse of the licensing scheme since the suit was brought on facial over-
breadth grounds, suggest that the majority probably was justified in rejecting the claim.
But my approach would help to avoid the sharp, dichotomous choice, about which the
Ninth Circuit judges split, as to whether a "date" involved either the intimate associa-
tion or expressive association held to warrant constitutional protection in Roberts v.
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the Court's conclusion that non-profit organizations are somehow
different for first amendment purposes 16 and might aid in consider-
ing the explosion of controversies in which freedom of association
claims are being raised today.157
VI. CONCLUSION
It certainly makes sense to think of judges as "jurispathic," as
Bob Cover suggested.' They wield violence on behalf of the state,
and they are inclined to control or even to kill off alternative narra-
tives and competing norms. It is important to realize, however, that
violence on behalf of the community is not always to be condemned
or avoided. Deference to the lowest common denominator-
whether it be Coach Lombardi's notion of treating everyone the
same, like dogs, orJustice Holmes's nasty version of Social Darwin-
ism, in which he claimed to detach himself and defer to whatever the
crowd would fight for' 59 -hardly seems sufficiently protective of key
constitutional rights threatened by statism and pure majoritarian-
ism. It is even possible for some few great judges, and Judge
Sobeloff surely was one of that rare breed, to be so compassionate,
so wise, and so creative as to help build rather than block the bridge
between law and justice. Such judges contribute to our legends;
United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), discussed supra note 26. The integrated bar
decision, on the other hand, seems correct largely because Wisconsin had already sev-
ered most important group functions and made them voluntary. Mandatory member-
ship in the bar association, therefore, was rightfully condemned by Judge Crabb as not
serving a compelling state interest; moreover, the defendants had failed to show "that in
the absence of mandatory membership, the Bar's goals could not be achieved." 679 F.
Supp. at 1501 (footnote omitted).
156. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 107 S. Ct. 616
(1986), discussed supra note 26. Though I obviously reject Brennan's lumping of all
union activities with all corporate activities, some union activities are properly classified
as economic and therefore not protected. But other union activities ate not purely eco-
nomic and should be protected. This resonates with the long tradition of attempts by
workers to reject the notion that a person's labor is simply a commodity to be sold for
the best price. It also helps explain the difficult but important line-drawing task in the
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)-Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S.
435 (1984) line of cases distinguishing economic from political, ideological, and other
activities. See Brudney, Association, Liberty, and the First Amendment (1988) (manu-
script on file with author).
157. See, e.g., New York Club v. City of New York, No. 86-1836 (U.S. arguments heard
Feb. 23, 1988). For a discussion of cases involving distinctions within groups, see Brud-
ney, supra note 156.
158. Violence, supra note 9, at 1610; Nomas, supra note 9, at 1140.
159. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460 (1897). See generally,
Hamilton, On Dating Mr. Justice Holmes, 9 U. CHi. L. REv. I (1941).
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they help us. struggle to fit old ghost stories to our present needs
and, more important, to our future aspirations.
The stories of what judges do-and what they do not do also is
vitally important-cannot be neatly plotted on a smooth curve be-
tween discrete points. Like Bible stories and other great tales, judi-
cial legends are full of tension and complexity. They contain
multidimensional responses to multilayered problems. According
to the Biblical rule, for example, the eldest son clearly should in-
herit; but in all the famous Bible stories, the eldest son loses out to a
younger brother. What are we to make of that contrariness? It is
hardly surprising to detect tension and difficulty in the great moral
and legal issues of our day. Yet the key decisions are made by
groups of us, not by isolated individuals.
We retain and create from our own traditions. Stories of heroic
acts and legends about seekers ofjustice are much more than mere
ghost stories. They may not comport with "the logical method and
form [that] flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is
in every human mind,"' 60 yet they must not be ignored. In trying to
shed a little light on what we might do about groups, I hope I have
at least made at bit more complexity somewhat appealing.
Our legends remind us that it is a mistake to take refuge in com-
placent oversimplification or to trust the nice clear binary choices
we like to consider to be appropriate rational limits. Gershom
Scholem once said, "Reason is a great instrument of destruction.
For construction, something beyond is required."'' If we are to
find the fragile material we need to pursue glimmerings of a better
world, we must heed multilayered stories that help us form and pass
on our identities together.
160. Id. at 466. Holmes added, "But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not
the destiny of man." Id. In the course of his peculiar discussion of the statute of limita-
tions and the law of prescription, however, Holmes noted, "The law can ask no better
justification than the deepest instincts of man." Id. at 477.
161. See Rothstein, A Fateful Intellectual Friendship, in 84 COMMENTARY 41, 44 (1987)
(quoting Scholem).
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